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In this paper, we describe South Africa’s value added tax (VAT), showing that (1) the VAT is 
mildly regressive and (2) it is an effective source of government revenue, compared to other tax 
instruments in South Africa. We evaluate the VAT in the context of other distortions in the 
economy by computing the marginal cost of funds—the effect of raising government revenue by 
increasing the VAT rates on household welfare. Then we evaluate alternative, revenue-neutral 
tax systems in which we reduce the VAT and raise income taxes. For the analysis, we use a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with detailed specification of South Africa’s tax 
system. Households are disaggregated into income deciles. We demonstrate that alternative tax 
structures can benefit low-income households without placing excess burdens on high-income 
households.  
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In September 1991, South Africa replaced its general sales tax (GST) with a consumption-type 
value added tax (VAT). The original statutory rate was 10 percent, which was subsequently 
raised to 14 percent in 1993.  The South Africa VAT is levied on the domestic supply and 
imports of goods and services, while exported goods (such as gold) and services
1 are zero-rated.  
With a rebate for intermediates and investment purchases, the VAT is generally seen as a 
consumption tax as the consumer pays it at the final stage of production.
2   The advantage of a 
VAT is that, unlike other indirect taxes, it eliminates the cascading effects of taxes on 
intermediate inputs and, as such, it removes distortions affecting input choices in production. 
 
Initially, there were concerns about the regressiveness of the VAT. To assist the poor, selected 
foods (such as brown bread, maize meal, milk and milk powder, rice, unprocessed vegetables 
and fruits) and paraffin were zero rated. There were also concerns that it would be difficult to 
administer and that it would place a burden on small businesses. There were doubts that a VAT 
could replace the GST as a source of government revenue. 
 
Some of these initial concerns about a VAT have not materialized.  For example, small firms 
were excluded for social reasons as well as to simplify the system. The VAT has proven to be a 
stable and broad-based source of government revenue. The tax collection method of a VAT 
encourages “self-policing”—producers are more likely to purchase intermediates from sellers 
who can verify that they have paid the value added taxes due.
3 However, the VAT is mildly 
regressive (see Fourie and Owen (1993) and Figure 1 in section 2.1), despite efforts to zero rate 
commodities important to low-income households.
4  
 
In this paper, we analyze the welfare and income distribution effects of possible reforms to South 
Africa’s value added tax in order to improve its equity impact while maintaining its strong 
revenue features. We use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of South Africa, with 
data for 2001.
5 We extend the model to include VAT payments with rebates on intermediate 
inputs. There are 10 households according to income deciles. We allow for unemployment in the 
semi-skilled and unskilled labor categories. 
 
First, we describe the incidence of the VAT.  Following Devarajan and Hossain (1995) we 
remove the VAT from the price system and replace it with a proportional increase in the income 
tax. With this approach, we maintain public expenditure levels because government revenue does 
not change and, because we use a direct tax to restore government revenue, we do not distort the 
                                                 
1Exports do not attract VAT – an important feature of all VAT systems. There are some definitional and 
administrative problems with regard to international traded services that are under review. 
 
2 Go and Mitra (1999) use a CGE model that incorporate a similar VAT for India.  For the history and issues about 
VAT as a tax instrument, see Baker and Elliott (1997) and Ebill et al. (2001) for example.  
3 See Kearney (2004).   
4 This does not mean that the whole tax system is regressive—see tax structure in section 2. 
5 In this paper we expand upon the tax specification in the CGE model originally programmed by Marna Kearney 
(see Go and Kearney, 2003) and which uses the standard CGE model code developed by Lofgren et al. (2001). The 
Social Account Matrix in that model was commissioned by the World Bank and constructed by Quantec of South 
Africa.     3
pattern of indirect tax-incidence.
6 Next, we consider the welfare effects of a uniform increase in 
the VAT rates to increase government revenue. This scenario indicates the marginal cost of 
funds (MCF) and is a measure of how the VAT operates in the context of other model 
distortions. Finally, we describe alternative tax structures that are revenue neutral and that shift 
the tax burden away from low-income households: (1) we uniformly reduce VAT tax rates and 
increase income taxes on high-income households; (2) we remove the VAT on agriculture and 
food and replace the lost government revenue with either an increase in the income tax rates on 
high-income households or an increase in the other VAT rates. 
 
We will use a variety of measures to describe the effect of a VAT on welfare. We report the 
regressiveness of the VAT, the progressiveness of the complete tax system, and the equivalent 
variation derived from the changes in household consumption.  We also show the effects of 
changes in the tax system on total government revenue, the components of government revenue, 
and the structure of the economy. 
 
We begin with a brief description of the CGE model, focusing on the tax structure and the 
changes necessary to represent a VAT with rebates. We then simulate alternative tax structures 
to describe the welfare effects of a VAT on various household groups. Our conclusions follow. 
 
2.  The CGE Model  
 
CGE models incorporate consumer and producer behavior as well as the interaction between 
other economic agents and therefore incorporate all effects on the distribution of income and 
economic welfare.  We use the CGE model by Löfgren et al (2001).
7  The CGE model equations 
are solved simultaneously with the computer software package GAMS and the solver PATH. 
 
2.1  The Tax Structure of South Africa 
 
Typical of a middle-income or more advanced developing country,  the tax base of South Africa 
is derived more from manufacturing activities and formal services, which now account for more 
than two-thirds of the economy.  The production structure of South Africa is reflected in Table 1, 
which is derived from a recent social accounting matrix (SAM).  While the mining sector 
remains a significant source of export revenue, its share in the economy is less than 7 percent 
and, as an export sector, it does not contribute to VAT revenue. 
 
                                                 
6 Devarajan and Hossain (1995) analyze the combined incidence of taxes and public expenditure in the Philippines.  
They simulated the price effect of a particular tax, by eliminating the tax from the Philippines tax system and 
simultaneously replacing it with an increase in proportional income tax (Devarajan and Hossain,1995:10).  
 
7 A detailed discussion on the mathematical structure of the standard model can be found in Löfgren et al (2001).     4
 
Table 1: Production structure of the economy by aggregate sector 
Aggregated Sector  Components  Percent of Total 
Output 
Agriculture  Agriculture Forestry and Fishing  3.3 
Fuels & Minerals  Coal Mining 
Gold and Uranium Ore Mining 
Other Mining 
6.7 
Food Products  Food 









Wood and Wood Products 
Paper and Paper Products 
Printing Publishing and Recorded Media 
Coke and Refined Petroleum Products 
Basic Chemicals 
Other Chemicals and Man-Made Fibers 
Rubber Products 
Plastic Products 
Glass and Glass Products 
Non-metallic Minerals 
Basic Iron and Steel 
Basic Non-ferrous Metals 
Metal Products Excluding Machinery 
Machinery and Equipment 
Electrical Machinery 
TV Radio and Communication Equipment 
Professional and Scientific Equipment 
Motor Vehicles Parts and Accessories 




Utilities  Electricity Gas and Steam 
Water supply 
2.4 
Construction  Construction and Civil Engineering  4.5 
Services  Wholesale and Retail Trade 
Catering and Accommodation 









General Government Administration 
General Government Defense 
General Government Law and Order 
General Government Education 
General Government Health 
General Government Social Services 
General Government Economic Services 
13.2 
Note: Production shares are calculated from SA SAM 2003. 
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The SAM for South Africa also reports taxes paid by institutions, commodity sales, and 
production activities.  The tax instruments and their share in total revenue are summarized in 
Table 2. 
 





Percent of total 
government 
revenue collected 
Institutional taxes (direct taxes) 
Corporate 
Tax 
Taxes Levied on 
Firms 
) (firms tins   20.5 
 Income Tax  Taxes Levied on 
Individuals 
(Households) 
) (h tins   37.3 
Commodity taxes (indirect taxes) 
   VAT  Value Added Tax   ) (c tvat   20.4  
   Fuel tax  Government levy 
on fuel 
) (c tfuel   5.3 
   Excise tax  Excise taxes on 
goods 
) (c texcise    3.1 
 Net taxes on 
products 
Other taxes on 
products excluding 
subsidies 
) (c tproducts  2.0 
   Tariffs  Taxes levied on 
imports of goods 
and services 
) (c tm    2.2 
Activity taxes 
 Net taxes on 
production 
Other taxes on 
production  
) (a ta   9.2 
Note: government revenue shares are calculated from SA SAM 2003. 
 
Consistent with other studies, we find that the VAT for South Africa is mildly regressive, see 
Figure 1. Low-income households pay a higher share of their income to VAT than do high-
income households. It is also evident in Figure 1 that the VAT is more regressive or at least no 
better than the other indirect taxes in South Africa. For this reason, there is room for changes to 
the tax system that would make the VAT less regressive.  
 
It should be emphasized that the whole tax system of South Africa is progressive.  Indeed, Davis 
and Kay (1985) as well as Fourie and Owen (1993) stress that the progressiveness of the 
complete tax system should be taken into account and one should not look at the distributional 
impact of VAT in isolation. When evaluating total taxes paid, including direct taxes on 
households, it is evident that high-income households pay a larger percentage of their income to 
taxes than low-income households, see Figure 2. 
   6
Figure 1:  The Regressiveness of Indirect taxes on Consumption in 2001  


























Source: SA SAM 2003 
 
 
Figure 2:  The progressiveness of the complete tax system in 2001 
 































Source: SA SAM 2003 
 
 
Devarajan and Panagariya (2000) show that a uniform value-added tax would closely mimic a 
lump-sum tax.  However, when commodities are left out of the tax base, there is an efficiency 
loss. This is certainly the case for South Africa as the South African Value-Added Tax Act 
No.89 of 1991 makes allowances for exemptions, exceptions, deductions and adjustments that 
effectively lower the VAT liability.  At inception various basic food items such as brown bread, 
maize meal, samp, mealie rice, dried mealies, dried beans, lentils, pilchards, milk powder, milk, 
rice, unprocessed vegetables and fruit, vegetable oil, and eggs were exempted from VAT (SA 
Tax, 2001:Schedule 2 Part B).  To reduce the regressiveness of VAT even further, paraffin, an 
energy source used by most poor households, was exempted in 2001.  However, suppliers 
absorbed most of the benefits and did not pass it on to the consumers as intended.  Various other 
exclusions exist:  Small firms supplying less than R300 000 per year are not required to register   7
as a VAT payer (SARS,2003). Some services provided within the financial sector are also 
exempt.  (International VAT Monitor,1995:376).   
 
In this paper, we take the economic and tax structure of the SAM, including the VAT and its 
exceptions, as the basis for the CGE model and we examine possible tax reforms that will 
improve welfare impact.  
 
 
2.2   Specification of a VAT with Rebates on Intermediate Inputs 
 
Rather than treat consumption tax payments as a retail sales tax, we specify a European-style 
value added tax with rebates for intermediate input and investment purchases. With this 
treatment, there is no cascading effect on prices of taxes on intermediate goods.  
 
We assume the VAT is administered using the “invoice method.” All transactions are taxed at a 
fixed proportional rate regardless of whether they are final or intermediate transactions. Firms 
can deduct taxes paid on intermediate inputs and that tax amount is reported on the invoices for 
intermediates. Import sales are subject to a VAT, export sales are not.  
 
To calibrate the model, we assume the observed VAT tax revenue in the SAM is the gross 
payment by sector.
8 Producers must pay the VAT on retail sales and can collect a rebate on taxes 
paid by intermediate input use. For each production activity, we compute the rebate on 
intermediate expenditure using data on input-output relationships. We assume a Leontief 
production structure with fixed input-output shares defining intermediate demand.  
 
The rebate to activity, A, is based on total intermediate input use: 
 
) , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( A C QINT C PQ C tvat A REBATE
c
⋅ ⋅ =∑  
where: 
tvat(C)   is the value added tax by commodity sales 
PQ(C)   is price of commodity c    
QINT(C, A)  is the quantity of intermediate commodity, c, purchased by activity, a 
 
The price of the aggregate intermediate input now includes the rebate per unit of aggregate 
intermediate input: 
 
) ( / ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( A QINTA A REBATE A C ica C PQ A PINTA
c
− ⋅ =∑  
where: 
 
PINTA(A)  is the price of the intermediate aggregate input 
PQ(C)   is the price of the composite commodity 
ica(C,A)  is the intermediate input c per unit of aggregate intermediate 
QINTA(A)  is the quantity of aggregate intermediate input 
                                                 
8 We use the effective tax rates based on tax collection data. The rates differ by sector and differ from the reported 
statutory rate of 14% due to sector aggregation, the treatment of the informal sector and/or measurement error. 
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The price, PINTA(A) is used in the producer’s first order condition over the intermediate 
aggregate input and the primary factor aggregate input. 
 
The original SAM data does not include a rebate account. Taxes paid by the activity to the 
government are net of subsidies. The rebate is a subsidy on the use of intermediate inputs. When 
we use rebates explicitly in the model, the tax payment from the activity to the government must 
be adjusted upward to add back in the subsidy payment. The indirect tax rate, ta(A),  must be 
recomputed to take into account the adjustment to the SAM. 
 
The value added tax revenue paid to the government (VATREV) becomes: 
 
∑ ∑ − ⋅ ⋅ =
ca
a REBATE c QQ c PQ c tvat VATREV ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 
 
 
Much of the analysis of tax policy reform depends on the initial tax rates in the base data. We use 
the following tax rates as found in the SAM for South Africa:   9
Table 3:  Base tax rates 
  Consumption Production 
 Commodity  Tariff  VAT  rates  Indirect  Rebate 
          
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  0  1.2  1.6  0  0 
Coal Mining  0  0  0.3  1.3  0 
Gold and Uranium Ore Mining        1.5  0 
Other Mining  0  0  0.1  0.6  0 
Food 0.2  2.3  5.5  0.3  0 
Beverages and Tobacco 7.3  39.3  10.1  0.7  0 
Textiles 0.9  8.9 2.4  1.5  2.5 
Wearing Apparel  0.3  11.9  3.8  1.6  2.9 
Leather and Leather Products  0.5  0.9  0.2  3.5  5.7 
Footwear 0.5  6.1  3.3  1.1  1.7 
Wood and Wood Products  0  1.1  0.5  1.6  1.9 
Paper and Paper Products 0.2  6.3  0.4  1.3  1.8 
Printing, Publishing, and Recorded Media  0.2  1.3  3.6  1.3  1.9 
Petroleum 20.6  0.2  11.7  1.8  1.0 
Basic Chemicals  0.2  1.2  0.8  2.8  3.2 
Other Chemicals and Man-Made Fibers  0.3  1.4  2.8  2.3  2.6 
Rubber Products  4.2  6.1  0.9  1.4  1.8 
Plastic Products  1.7  1.4  0.3  0.9  1.4 
Glass and Glass Products  1.6  1.3  0.3  1.4  2.3 
Non-metallic Minerals  0.3 2.3  0.8 1.8 1.8 
Basic Iron and Steel  0  1.1  0.1  1.5  1.9 
Basic Non-ferrous Metals  0  0.2  0  1.2  1.7 
Metal Products Excluding Machinery  0.8  3.5  1.5  1  1.4 
Machinery and Equipment  0.3  2.3  3.7  1.7  2.3 
Electrical Machinery  2.3  4.9  1.5  1.3  1.6 
TV, Radio, and Communication Equip  3.5  2.5  3.6  1.8  3.1 
Professional and Scientific Equip  3.7  0.4  2.4  2.8  2.7 
Motor Vehicles Parts and Accessories  0.2  2.6  4.1  2.4  3.7 
Other Transport Equipment  5  0  1.1  2.1  1.5 
Furniture 1  14.9  6.4  0.9  1.6 
Other Industries  2.5  5.3  11.3  0.9  1.4 
Electicity, Gas, and Steam  0  0  2.9  1.3  1.7 
Water Supply   0  0  2.1  1.9  2.4 
Construction and Civil Engineering  0  0  3.3  2.3  2.9 
Wholesale and Retail Trade  -0.4  0  1.4  3  2.5 
Catering and Accomodation  0  0  4.9  4.7  6.2 
Transportation and Storage  -0.3  0  0.2  4.1  8.4 
Comunication 0.2  0  2.1  1.9  3.4 
Financial Services  2.2  0  0.9  2.4  1.8 
Business Services  1.4  0  2  7.3  2.9 
Health, Community, Social, and Personal Services  0  0  4.5  3.1  3.9 
Other  Producers  0  0  2.5  2.5  3.3 
General Govt Administration  0  0  0.1  0.4  0 
General Govt Defense  0.8  0  0.8  3.6  0 
General Govt Law and Order  0  0  0.1  0.4  0 
General Govt Education  0  0  0.1  0.3  0 
General Govt Health  0.1  0  0.1  0.8  0 
General Govt Social Services  0.1  0  0.1  0.6  0 
General Govt Economic Services  0  38.8  0.2  1.1  0 
          
Note: Rebate is defined here as the rebate payment as a percent of the aggregate intermediate used in production: rebate/qinta Consumption 
 
It is evident in Table 3 that the value added tax rates vary by commodity, with high VAT rates 
applying to beverages (10.1 percent) and food (5.5 percent). 
 
2.3 Tax  Incidence   10
 
From basic welfare economics it is known that per-unit taxes like VAT are more likely to 
introduce price distortions than lump-sum taxes.  The question that often arises is “who pays the 
tax?” (McLure,1987:1).  With consumption taxes consumers and producers share the burden, 
however, the producer often tries to shift the burden to the consumer.  The extent to which a per-
unit tax can be shifted to the consumer is determined by the elasticity of supply and demand 
(Ebrill et al,2001:15).   
 
A CGE model is very useful to analyze tax incidence because it captures the effect of each tax on 
prices. When we simulate the removal of the VAT (or any other indirect tax instrument), the 
model solves for market clearing prices and quantities that are consistent with the individual 
optimizing behavior of consumers and producers, a given set of world prices, and the policy 
environment.
9 The model also has data on consumption expenditures by households, and 
therefore indicates the effects of tax changes on real purchasing power for each income decile. 
 
As seen in Table 4, poor households spend the majority (61 percent) of their income on food. In 
contrast, high-income households spend 15 percent of their income on food. The reverse pattern 
holds for services: high-income households spend over 45 percent of their income on service 
while low-income households spend less than 20 percent on services. Low-income households 
do not purchase motor vehicles, an example of a luxury good.  
                                                 
9 See Devarajan and Hossain (1995) for a more detailed discussion of mechanisms at work in a 
CGE model when one removes an indirect tax and replaces it with a direct tax. 
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h_d0  0.07  0.61  0.05  0.07  0.00 0.05 0.14 
h_d1  0.06  0.59  0.06  0.07  0.00 0.05 0.17 
h_d2  0.06  0.55  0.07  0.08  0.00 0.04 0.20 
h_d3  0.06  0.51  0.08  0.08  0.00 0.03 0.24 
h_d4  0.05  0.46  0.08  0.09  0.00 0.03 0.29 
h_d5  0.04  0.41  0.08  0.11  0.01 0.03 0.31 
h_d6  0.04  0.36  0.08  0.13  0.01 0.03 0.35 
h_d7  0.03  0.31  0.07  0.15  0.03 0.03 0.37 
h_d8  0.03  0.25  0.06  0.18  0.05 0.03 0.41 
h_d91  0.02  0.19  0.05  0.19  0.06 0.02 0.46 
h_d921  0.02  0.15  0.04  0.22  0.07 0.02 0.49 
h_d922  0.02  0.15  0.04  0.21  0.07 0.02 0.50 
h_d923  0.02  0.15  0.04  0.21  0.08 0.02 0.49 
h_d924  0.02  0.15  0.03  0.19  0.09 0.01 0.52 
Note: household expenditure for the commodities “fuel and other minerals” and “government services” were 
very close to zero and are not reported in this table. 
 
3.   Model Closure Rules 
 
A CGE model specifies closures for factor markets, savings, the government, and the rest of the 
world. The following closure rules are chosen to represent macroeconomic conditions in South 
Africa; they are used in all scenarios except those used to compute the marginal cost of funds. 
The changes needed to compute the MCF are described with that scenario in section 6.3. 
 
To represent the labor market situation in South Africa, we assume capital and high-skilled labor 
are fully employed and activity specific, while semi-skilled and low-skilled labor are 
unemployed and mobile.  For capital and high-skilled labor total employment will not change, 
only the factor payment, which is activity-specific, will change. For semi- and unskilled labor 
nominal wages will remain constant as these factors experience high levels of unemployment.
10  
The only factor that would change for semi- and unskilled labor is employment. 
  
We assume investment is savings driven.  The marginal propensity to save for all non-
government institutions will be fixed, while capital formation is flexible.  The level of savings 
determines investment.  Nell (2002) examines the long-run exogeneity between saving and 
investment in South Africa and finds that private savings is strongly exogenous to private 
investment in the period 1977 to 2001.  This implies that the savings level will determine 
investment.  (Nell,2002:26).   
 
When analyzing tax reforms, we assume government revenue does not change. Instead, other tax 
rates adjust when we remove or reduce the VAT.  
 
                                                 
10 Depending in the choice of numeraire, real wages may also be held constant when the nominal wages are held 
constant. For example, when the consumer price index is the numeraire, real wages are held constant. In this version 
of the model, the producer price index is the numeraire. Tax changes can affect the consumer price index.   12
We assume a flexible exchange rate with fixed foreign savings. This is a common specification 
in real trade models. It is assumed that any changes in the trade balance are determined by 
macroeconomic forces working mostly in asset markets which are not included in the model. 
 
4. The  Data 
 
The South Africa SAM is based on 2001 data including: 
 
•  SSA IO 1971-1993 
•  SSA SUT 1993-1998 
•  SAM 1998 
•  SARB published and unpublished data 1970-2001 
•  SSA industry censuses and surveys 
•  1970-1996 population census 
•  OHS 1994-1999 
•  LFS 2000-2002 
•  HH Income and expenditure survey 2000 
•  McGregor BFA 1970-2001 
•  ASSA 2000 Demographic model 
•  RSA Standardized Industry Database developed by Quantec.
11 
 
 The SAM consists of 49 commodities at industry level as well as 49 activities.  The government 
produces six of the 49 activities. There are four factors of production, capital, high-skilled, semi-
skilled and unskilled labor.  The households are divided into the 10 income deciles.  Due to the 
magnitude of the 10
th decile it is further divided into 95 percent, 96.25 percent, 97.5 percent and 
98.75 percent.
12 Elasticities used in the model are from Gibson(2003), Van Heerden and Van der 
Merwe (1997), the CGE model of Lewis (2001) and Thurlow and Van Seventer (2002). 
 
From the data in the SAM, we compute effective tax rates. These are the tax rates that change 
when we evaluate tax reforms. In South Africa, there are indirect taxes levied on either products 
or production and direct taxes levied on households and firms.  Indirect taxes on products include 
value added tax, fuel levies, excise duties, and tariffs, while indirect on production would include 
payroll taxes.  
 
5.  Simulations and Results 
 
First, we evaluate the current tax structure. We remove the VAT and consider the following 
revenue neutral tax changes: (1) a uniform adjustment to all direct taxes on households and 
firms; (2) a uniform adjustment to income taxes for households in the 10
th decile; and (3) a 
uniform adjustment to all commodity tax rates. The first scenario allows us to evaluate the 
                                                 
11 The data construction was commissioned by the World Bank in 2002/2003 and developed by Claude Van der 
Merwe from Quantec. See Van Der Merwe (2002) for a description of the sources used. 
12 The SA SAM (2003) includes residuals on the capital factor payment column as well as residuals on the 
commodity receipts row.  The capital factor residual was removed by assuming the capital factor returns of firms 
contains undisclosed items, the factor returns was increased as well as the savings of firms to the same extent.  The 
residual in the commodity row was entered into the change in stock variable.  A balanced SAM was estimated using 
entropy by assuming the production technologies and the tax structure is known.   13
incidence of the VAT, similar to the analysis in Devarajan and Hossain who analyze sales taxes 
rather than a VAT. We also describe how effective the VAT is at generating government revenue 
and compare it to other tax instruments. To further evaluate the current tax structure, we describe 
the marginal cost of funds (MCF), computed as the change in welfare per unit of tax revenue 
collected from each household, for the VAT, tariffs, and indirect taxes. 
 
Next, we describe the trade-off between a VAT and income tax adjustments to high-income 
households. We reduce the VAT rates by 25% (50%, 75%) and show the necessary increases in 
the income tax rate for households in the 10
th decile.   
 
Finally, we consider changes in the structure of VAT rates. We remove the VAT for agriculture, 
food, and beverages, commodities on which low-income households spend a large portion of 
their incomes, and replace the lost revenue with (1) a uniform adjustment to all direct taxes on 
households and firms; (2) a uniform adjustment to income taxes for households in the 10
th decile; 
and (3) a uniform adjustment to other VAT rates. 
 
5.1   Remove VAT with Tax Replacement 
 
When we remove the VAT and replace lost revenue with a proportional increase in direct taxes, 
we can compute the incidence of the VAT. As noted in Devarajan and Hossain, this allows us to 
examine the “true” price-distorting effect of the tax; we avoid price changes generated by 
macroeconomic imbalances as government revenue declines.  In addition to a proportional 
increase in direct taxes, we also consider a proportional increase in commodity taxes and a 
proportional increase in income taxes on rich households only.
13 As seen in Figure 3, each 
change reduces the tax burden of low-income households. 
 











h_d0 h_d1 h_d2 h_d3 h_d4 h_d5 h_d6 h_d7 h_d8 h_d91 h_d921 h_d922 h_d923 h_d924
BASE COMMODITY DIRTAX  RICH HH 
 
Source: South Africa CGE model simulations 
 
When the tax revenue is replaced by a tax increase on high-income households, the overall tax 
system becomes even more progressive as the tax burden on rich households actually increases.  
 
                                                 
13 We also considered raising tariffs to replace tax revenue. As seen in Table 2, tariffs contribute a small share of 
total government revenue; given this low tax base, it is not feasible to increase tariffs to replace the lost tax revenue 
when the VAT is removed.   14
In contrast to the VAT, which is broad-based, the other indirect taxes levied on products, in 
South Africa, apply to a few sectors such as petroleum, beverages, and transport equipment. 
Indirect taxes on products (excluding VAT) account for 12.6 percent of total government tax 
revenue (see Table 2).When we remove the VAT and replace government revenue with a 
commodity tax, each rate must increase 262 percent. The overall tax burden is slightly more 
progressive as the tax burden for low-income households declines by more than the tax burden 
for high-income households. The tax burden is more progressive when either direct taxes or 
taxes on rich households adjust. A commodity tax still affects commodities that low-income 
household’s purchase and this offsets the gains from setting the VAT to zero. 
 
To describe the welfare effect of each tax shock, we report equivalent variation (EV), the income 
change that, at base prices, would yield the same utility as observed in the simulation (see Table 
5). In the base column, we report consumption value at base-year prices. For each scenario we 
report equivalent variation as a percent of base year consumption, a positive value indicates a 
welfare gain. Removing the VAT and replacing government revenue with a direct tax improves 
welfare for low and middle income households (i.e. those in the first six deciles), with the largest 
gain to the poorest households who spend a large share of their income on food which faces a 
relatively high VAT rates. In this scenario, firms bear some of the adjustment cost, as their direct 
tax rate increases (as do direct tax rates on all households) to replace the lost revenue from the 
VAT. As would be expected, the high-income households face a welfare loss when that group 
pays a higher income tax as the VAT is removed. High-income households also face a welfare 
loss when commodity taxes increase to replace lost VAT revenue. This is because the high-
income households have higher consumption shares for goods that face a commodity tax and 
whose tax rate increases dramatically in this scenario.   15
 
Table 5:  Equivalent Variation when Remove VAT with Tax Replacement  
 
    Remove VAT and replace with a uniform adjustment to : 
 
Base Direct  taxes 
 




h_d0  8.524 4.254 4.338  0.998 
h_d1 11.921  3.02  3.421  1.022 
h_d2  16.32 3.452 4.371  0.902 
h_d3  21.233 2.059 4.131  0.756 
h_d4  27.408 1.817 4.975  0.563 
h_d5  35.165 1.399 5.213  0.399 
h_d6  49.336 0.964 5.602  0.124 
h_d7  70.317 0.138 5.906  -0.176 
h_d8 106.417  -0.932  6.255  -0.501 
h_d91 83.058  -1.663  -12.132  -0.656 
h_d921 28.58  -0.48  -9.847  -0.902 
h_d922  33.727 -0.699 -8.714  -1.062 
h_d923 38.089  -1.89  -11.329  -1.103 
h_d924  78.538 -1.573 -6.361  -1.613 
Source: South Africa CGE model simulations 
 
 
5.2  Tax revenue  
 
Another way to evaluate the current tax structure is to report the effectiveness of each instrument 
as a source of government revenue. We consider 5 (10, 15, 20, 25) percent increases in indirect 
tax rates and report the percent change in government revenue in Figure 4. Both production taxes 
and the VAT have a broad tax base and therefore are more effective at generating government 
revenue than tariffs. 
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Source: South Africa CGE model simulations   16
5.3  Marginal Cost of Funds 
 
In addition to measuring how effective each tax instrument is at generating tax revenue, we also 
calculate the marginal cost of increasing taxes. To focus on the effect the tax change has on 
consumer welfare, we modify closure assumptions. We assume long run equilibrium in factor 
markets with all factors mobile across all sectors. The wage is endogenous and the supply of 
each factor is fixed. Investment is constant and savings adjusts. Real government spending is 
constant. There are no changes in the flow of foreign capital, instead the exchange rate adjusts. 
With this specification, any increase in government revenue is redistributed to households in a 
lump-sum fashion. The transfer amount to each household depends on the household’s initial 
savings rate.
14 High-income households receive a larger share. Our model does not include a 
labor-leisure trade off and it does not measure the administrative costs of the VAT.
15 In this 
context, the MCF is a measure of the inefficiencies in the structure of production. It depends not 
just on the tax being raised, but also on other distortions in the economy—and whether they 
increase or decrease in response to the tax increase.  For instance, in an economy with a very 
high tax on coffee, the MCF raised by taxing tea may be quite low, since the tax would induce 




To describe the MCF by household, we report the change in household welfare, relative to the 
change in household taxes paid.  
 
Table 6:  Marginal Cost of Funds 
 
Increase government revenue with a 
uniform increase in: 
  VAT  Commodity Tax  
h_d0 0.762  0.594 
h_d1 0.541  0.290 
h_d2 0.699  0.561 
h_d3 0.402  0.167 
h_d4 0.475  0.360 
h_d5 0.419  0.345 
h_d6 0.314  0.286 
h_d7 0.194  0.215 
h_d8 0.283  0.458 
h_d91 0.194  0.409 
h_d921 0.550  0.907 
h_d922 -0.067  0.136 
h_d923 -0.290  -0.157 
h_d924 -1.224  -1.233 
Total 0.003  0.022 
Source: South Africa CGE model simulations 
 
                                                 
14 Since investment is constant, an increase in government savings (due to an increase in tax rates in this scenario) is 
offset by a decrease in household savings; in effect there is a lump sum transfer to the households. 
15 Ballard and Fullerton (1992) note, that while administration and compliance costs are important, they have been 
ignored by economists studying the marginal cost of funds since the 1970s. 
16 For more discussion of the MCF of indirect taxes in developing countries, see Devarajan, Thierfelder, and 
Suthiwart-Narueput (2001). See Ballard et al (1985) for a description of the MCF for the United States.   17
The marginal cost of funds of a VAT is higher for low-income households than for rich 
households. Indeed the rich households are better off because they receive a bigger share of the 
total lump sum transfer from the tax increase. The low-income households now pay higher prices 
for commodities such as food that are subject to a higher VAT in this scenario. It is interesting to 
note that in the aggregate, the marginal cost of funds is negligible for a VAT. A similar MCF 
pattern across households and in aggregate holds for commodity taxes. The low MCFs in 
aggregate reflect the fact that South Africa’s tax rates are within a narrow range.  
 
5.4 VAT  Reforms 
 
5.4a Income  tax  changes 
 
Given the regressive nature of the value added tax in South Africa, we consider alternative tax 
structures that are less regressive. First, we describe the trade off between value added taxes and 
income taxes on the rich households, which we define as those in the tenth decile. In Table 7 we 
report the new household income tax rates when we reduce the VAT and when we remove the 
VAT for food.  
 
We find that when we reduce the VAT rates by 25 percent, the income tax rate on rich 
households must increase by 21 percent, when the VAT is reduced by 75 percent, the income tax 
rate on rich households must increase by 60 percent. As seen in Table 7, even when we remove 
the VAT and replace tax revenue with an increase in income taxes on high-income households, 
the tax rates are all under 33 percent. 
 
Low-income households benefit from this tax change as the VAT burden becomes less 
regressive, as seen in Figure 5. 
 
We also report the effects of removing the VAT on food, a commodity upon which low-income 
households spend a high proportion of their income. We find that when the rich households bear 
the burden as their income taxes increase, the new income tax rates are all under 23 percent.   18
 
Table 7: Effects of VAT reforms on tax rates when high-income income taxes adjust 
 
  Base rates  Reduce VAT:  0 FOOD VAT 
   25%  50%  75%  100%   
Firms  0.128 0.128 0.128  0.128  0.128  0.128 
h_d0  0 0 0  0  0  0 
h_d1  0.011 0.011 0.011  0.011  0.011  0.011 
h_d2  0.024 0.024 0.024  0.024  0.024  0.024 
h_d3  0.052 0.052 0.052  0.052  0.052  0.052 
h_d4  0.08 0.08 0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08 
h_d5  0.095 0.095 0.095  0.095  0.095  0.095 
h_d6  0.111 0.111 0.111  0.111  0.111  0.111 
h_d7  0.135 0.135 0.135  0.135  0.135  0.135 
h_d8  0.169 0.169 0.169  0.169  0.169  0.169 
h_d91  0.185 0.223 0.259  0.294  0.328  0.221 
h_d921  0.168 0.203 0.236  0.268  0.299  0.201 
h_d922  0.16 0.193 0.224  0.255  0.284  0.191 
h_d923  0.181 0.219 0.255  0.289  0.322  0.217 
h_d924  0.144 0.173 0.202  0.229  0.255  0.172 
Source: South Africa CGE model simulations 
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5.4b VAT  Rate  Reforms 
 
Finally, we consider restructure the VAT rates to make the tax instrument less regressive. We 
remove the VAT for food and increase the other VAT rates by 16.4 percent to replace the lost 
government revenue. As seen in Figure 6, the revised VAT structure is no longer regressive: the 
VAT payments as a percentage of household income increase as income increase, reversing the 
pattern observed with the initial VAT rates in place.   19
 
























In this paper, we analyze the VAT in South Africa, using the effective rates observed in the 
Social Accounting Matrix for 2001. We find: 
 
•  The VAT in South Africa is mildly regressive; the over all tax system is not. 
 
•  The marginal cost of funds for the VAT is higher for low-income households than for 
high-income households. 
 
•  A VAT is the most effective instrument for generating government revenue. 
 
•  One can restructure the VAT system to make it less regressive, or even progressive. 
 
•  There is scope for redesigning the tax system without imposing serious strain on high-
income households. Minor changes in the tax structure can have a substantial impact on 
the tax burden for low-income households. We illustrate a few possibilities in this paper. 
When we remove the VAT and increase the income tax rates for high income households, 
all rates are under 33 percent. Alternatively, when we restructure the VAT rates and 
eliminate the VAT on commodities important to low-income household consumption, 
other VAT rates increase by 16.4 percent. One can construct an alternative mix of VAT 
and other taxes that is more progressive than the existing VAT system. 
   20
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